

The Handbook for School Safety and Security

The Handbook for School Safety and Security

Best Practices and Procedures

Edited by

Lawrence J. Fennelly

Marianna A. Perry



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*To my husband, Tom . . . for your support and understanding while I was
working on this book and your patience with my many other projects.
I'm glad that the new chapter in my life includes you.*

I Love You. Marianna

*He once said no one ever dedicated a book to him. So here it is, Bill Fenn.
This is dedicated to you, my son.*

Love you. Dad

Security implies a stable, relatively predictable environment in which an individual or group may pursue its ends without disruption or harm and without fear of disturbance or injury.

Robert Fischer, Edward Halibozeck, and David Walters,
Introduction to Security, 9th ed., 2012

FOREWORD

Over the years, school security has been forced to evolve to meet the ever-changing threats facing our schools today. It has moved from a soft approach to high tech, more hardened security solutions to keep students, faculty, and staff in our schools safe. There have been incidents on school campuses throughout history; however, the shootings at Columbine, Red Lake, Virginia Tech, and Sandy Hook, to name a few, have changed how we as security professionals analyze and approach school security. We are always learning and improving our security management after an incident in an effort to stay in front of the latest trends.

With this book, Larry Fennelly and Marianna Perry are delivering much needed, high-quality, safety and security advice that is feasible as well as practical, for K-12 schools. Both Larry and Marianna, along with their contributing authors, are among the most respected names in the security industry today, and they propose a holistic, all encompassing approach to security *to keep our schools safe*. We as security professionals must lead the way to help prevent more incidents from occurring in our schools. In order to do this, we are forced to change the way we think about school security and move away from traditional approaches that unfortunately, in most cases, are no longer effective.

School administrators and security professionals alike will benefit greatly from the information in this book. The book contains several international chapters, whose problems as well as solutions are the very same as ours. *From the first chapter to the last this is a must read.*

Chris Hertig, CPP, said about the announcement of this book on LinkedIn, “A Comprehensive Foundation and Forward-Leaning book on this is needed,” and I agree.

Linda Watson, CPP, CSC, CHS-V
Whirlaway Group, LLC
Independent Security Consultant
Chairperson, ASIS International School Safety and Security Council
Member, International Association of Professional Security Consultants

PREFACE

We completed this book in about 6 months. Normally, this undertaking would take 18-24 months. We know that it's hard to believe, but it's true. We both know that the faster we could complete this book, get it published and into the hands of those who are responsible for school security, then possibly we could help prevent another incident from happening at a school.

We found ourselves calling each other after incidents were reported on the news: Atlanta, a shopping mall shooting; schools closed down in New Hampshire and Kansas City; the list goes on and on. We recently addressed 80 school administrators and told them that a violent incident was going to happen again this year at a school, but we couldn't tell them when or where—and they knew it also. It is difficult to say these kinds of things, but we're sure it was even more difficult for them to hear.

Set security standards for your schools. Conduct a security assessment. Follow CPTED principles and security best practices. After you've done so, call your local media to promote your accomplishments. Let the bad guys know that you take crime prevention and effective security at *your* school serious!

Times have changed. You know that. We are concerned because we know that many of our schools do not have adequate security in place to protect our children. We are not advocating that you make your school a prison for children, and we do not want you to turn your school into a cold, uninviting fortress. Instead, we want schools to be safe environments where our children learn and grow, but also has effective security in place to address vulnerabilities. Our children should feel safe and secure at school and parents should have the peace of mind that they will see their children happy and healthy at the end of the school day. It's simply a matter of changing the way you think about schools. Be smart about securing your school by training your students, faculty and staff about keeping themselves safe—increase awareness, but not fear. Talk with other schools and find out what they are doing that is working. Establish partnerships and teams to implement security measures that are effective, but not overly intrusive. We are all playing by a different set of rules now, so let's play to win!

We wish to sincerely thank all of our contributors who made this book possible. We truly believe that compiling the knowledge of many security professionals is a more comprehensive approach to addressing the issue of school security. We thank you for your professionalism as well as your contributions. We will measure the success of this project by the number of incidents that do *not* occur in our schools because of the information in this book.

**Marianna Perry
Lawrence J. Fennelly**

ABOUT THE EDITORS AND CONTRIBUTORS

EDITORS

Lawrence J. Fennelly, Security Expert Witness and Consultant, Litigation Consultants Inc.

Lawrence J. Fennelly is an internationally recognized authority on crime prevention, security planning and analysis, and on the study of how environmental factors (CPTED), physical hardware, alarms, lighting, site design, management practices, litigation consultants, security policies and procedures, and guard management contribute to criminal victimization.

Mr. Fennelly was previously employed with Apollo Security and Computershare, Inc., as well as a sergeant at Harvard College, employed by the Harvard University Police Department in Cambridge, Massachusetts. He was trained as a crime prevention specialist and served in this capacity for over 21 years at Harvard. He was also the department's training officer and assistant court officer. As part of his role as an officer at Harvard, Larry also was a deputy sheriff in both Suffolk and Middlesex counties (Massachusetts).

Mr. Fennelly is a frequent speaker and lecturer on CPTED, physical security, school crime, and other issues. He serves as an expert witness who works closely with attorneys in defense as well as plaintiff cases, assisting in case preparation, offering knowledgeable questions to ask the opposing side, etc. He has also done a considerable amount of consultant work throughout the United States. His experience ranges from identifying vulnerabilities to conducting security and lighting surveys, working with architects to design and implement security, and developing long-range guard training programs and risk assessments of various facilities.

He is also a prolific author. His titles include such well-known security tomes as "Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design," "Effective Physical Security," and "Handbook of Loss Prevention and Crime Prevention."

Marianna A. Perry, Training and Development Manager for Securitas Security Services USA, Inc.

Marianna A. Perry is currently a training and development manager for Securitas Security Services USA, Inc. She also operates Loss Prevention and Safety Management, LLC and is adjunct faculty at Sullivan University (Kentucky). She is a former detective with the Kentucky State Police and was previously the director of the National Crime Prevention Institute (NCPI) at the University of Louisville. She is vice chair of the Crime Prevention and Loss Prevention Council and a member of the School Safety and Security Council.

Marianna has been a contributing author for several security publications, has written numerous articles on safety and security topics, and is a frequent speaker on crime prevention topics. Marianna also develops training programs and conducts physical security assessments for educational institutions and other organizations.

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Raymond Andersson is an international, national, and corporate security professional, employed in the national government sector in Australia. He is a member of the Australasian Council of Security Professionals (ACSP), the peak representational body for the security profession in Australia and New Zealand, and chairs its Ethics and Behaviour Standards Committee.

Ray is a fellow of the Security Institute (FSyl), a United Kingdom-based professional body for security professionals. He is a member of ASIS International Queensland/Northern Territory Chapter and an active member and secretary of the ASIS International Crime and Loss Prevention Council. The Council establishes and sustains relationships for the common purpose of preventing crime, as well as encourages the exchange of effective security concepts and other information between law enforcement, private security, and ASIS.

Ray was awarded the designation of International Crime Prevention Specialist (ICPS) on mastery and testing of the International Society of Crime Prevention Practitioners (ISCPP), International Crime Prevention Specialist Curriculum. ISCPP is a network of crime prevention practitioners whose mission is to provide leadership, foster cooperation, encourage information exchange, and seek involvement from all segments of society in the expansion and improvement of crime prevention programs internationally.

Ray is an elected member and Northern Territory of Australia representative on the Australian Crime Prevention Council. The objectives for the Council are: to assist and promote the prevention of crime, to develop awareness and better understanding of the problems of crime and methods properly available to prevent it, to encourage participation by citizens in the prevention of crime and the alleviation of social injustices, and to provide a forum for the free discussion of crime prevention issues.

Ray is an elected member of the Worshipful Company of Security Professionals which is the 108th and newest Livery Company of the City of London, a charitable organization providing education and health services to members of the security profession.

Ray has been employed in private and public sector organizations providing advice on security and business risk, protective security, crime prevention, security and business policy and planning for over 28 years. He is also a registered security professional (RSecP) and associate fellow of the Australian Institute of Management (AFAIM).

Mark H. Beaudry, Ph.D., CPP, Instructor, Researcher, and Author in Security Studies at Various Universities in Massachusetts

Mark Beaudry is a retired intelligence chief and antiterrorism instructor from the United States Marine Corps. He is a security practitioner since 1976 and an educator since 1989 (adjunct for Northeastern University, UMass Lowell, Anna Maria College, and others). Dr. Beaudry received an Associate in Science degree in Criminal Justice from Mount Wachusett Community College, a Bachelor and Master of Science in Criminal Justice from Northeastern University, and a PhD in Criminal Justice at Capella University.

Dr. Beaudry has also been a member of ASIS International since 1982 and a Certified Protection Professional (CPP) since 1996. He is an active participant in many groups within ASIS, including the Academic Practitioner Symposium, Crime Prevention and Loss Prevention Council, Critical Infrastructure Working Group, the Research Council (vice chair), and the Leadership Management and Practices Council (chair).

Dr. Beaudry is a frequent contributor of articles and book reviews to security journals. He has authored the following publications and contributed chapters:

- Authored, *Contemporary Lodging Security*, Butterworth-Heinemann, Woburn, MA.
- Fennelly, Lawrence. *Handbook on Crime Prevention and Loss Prevention*. Butterworth-Heinemann, Woburn, MA. Contributed a chapter on lodging security.

- ASIS Standing Committee on Lodging Security Anthology: Tactics that Work; An Overview of Security Management.
- Workplace Violence Research Institute: Premises Security & Liability—Contributed a chapter on “Lodging Security.”
- ASIS International Standard—Private Security Officer Selection and Training Guideline, committee member.
- International Real Estate Management. Contributed chapter on “Managing Computer Security Risks.”
- ASIS Protection of Assets Manual. Contributed chapter on “Terrorism.”
- Co-authored, Security in the Year 2020, ASIS International.
- PhD Dissertation: Faculty Perceptions of Factors to Develop a Paradigm for Security Studies.

Gregory Bernardo, CHS-IV, CDT, CVI, Vice President, Aella Consulting Group, Inc.

Gregory Bernardo, CHS-IV, CDT, CVI, is the vice president of Aella Consulting Group, Inc. In his career, Mr. Bernardo spent time with a major CCTV manufacturer (Vicon Industries) with responsibilities in design response and project engineering. Considerable time with this manufacturer was spent in engineering oversight of large-scale end-user projects in cooperation with the integrator and client. As a subject matter expert and strong application design and project management experience, Mr. Bernardo was with Ross & Baruzzini, a prestigious international architect and engineering firm, where he performed site surveys and security assessments, development of mitigation plans, systems design, bid project specification documentation, drafting, equipment and labor estimation, and grant writing.

As a parent of a school-aged children and as a security professional, the subject of security within schools continues to be an area he addresses and maintains involvement. His involvement has been in many areas including national councils working to develop standards and continuing to provide information and expertise whenever possible. Mr. Bernardo has written other published works and holds design patents within the physical security field.

Inge Sebyan Black, B.A., CPP, CFE, CPOI, Principal Consultant and Owner of Security Investigations Consulting

Inge Sebyan Black, B.A., CPP, CFE, CPOI, is the principal consultant and owner of Security Investigations Consulting, providing security, fraud, investigations and emergency management consulting. Inge has been in security management for 35 years, joining ASIS in 1983. Inge earned her bachelor’s degree in Criminal Justice from Metropolitan State University, along with a degree in Police Science. Inge is a Certified Protection Professional (CPP), Certified Fraud Examiner (CFE), and Certified Protection Officer Instructor (CPOI), and is also certified as an Emergency Manager through FEMA and the State of Minnesota.

Inge has held her license as a Private Investigator in Minnesota, Ontario and Quebec. She is certified in Minnesota to train security personnel and taught security management at St. Paul Technical College in St. Paul, MN.

Although based in the United States, Inge spent 2 years in Canada conducting security risk assessments for both the government and private sector. She also conducts security audits and writes policies and procedures. She has trained security management in areas of contract security, emergency planning and physical security audits, interviews and investigations.

Inge is also an author and has written numerous publications, most recently wrote *The Art of Investigative Interviewing*, third edition, and has been a presenter for sessions and workshops at various ASIS International conferences. Inge currently serves as chair for the ASIS International Council for Crime Prevention and Loss Prevention and was on the Physical Security Council for 4 years previously.

Sjoerd Boersma, Senior Advisor and Partner, DSP-groep and Co-owner of IRIS

Sjoerd Boersma got his master's degree in International Land and Water Management at the University of Wageningen (Netherlands). During his studies, he specialized in the social side of technology development. The interface between technology and people is the common thread in his work.

After his graduation, Sjoerd joined the EYE film institute as head of the department of projection technology. His work involved the development and introduction of several new systems in the field of sound, image and subtitles. In 1997 he became involved in new media. As a project and account manager he developed many Web sites and CD-rom's for a variety of customers.

IRIS Safe & Secure schools started in 2004 following an investigation on the safety situation in schools in Amsterdam. Sjoerd was involved in the development and implementation of IRIS in many Dutch schools.

IRIS is a licensed software package for schools to register incidents, carry out surveys, assess the crime situation in schools, and to conduct audits (app). The results are presented on a simple dashboard and because the information is stored in a central database it is easy to make a comparison of the safety situation in all schools that use IRIS.

In 2012, Sjoerd co-founded LearningStone.com, a digital learning and communication platform. LearningStone is internationally used in formal education and by training professionals in agencies, companies, and institutions who need to support class based or blended learning. Sjoerd joined DSP in 2004 and is co-owner of IRIS.

Michael D. Brown, CPP, PCI, PSP, Founder and Director, MDB Consulting Agency

Michael D. Brown, CPP, PCI, PSP is the founder of MDB Consulting Agency and serves as its director of corporate security administration. Before founding MDB Consulting Agency, Michael completed a 20-year career with the Buffalo Police Department in Buffalo, New York, serving as a detective from 1999 to his retirement in 2008. He worked in the Robbery Squad, Special Frauds Unit, General Investigations Unit and the Narcotics Squad. Upon retiring, Michael joined Securitas Security Services, USA, first as an account manager for Toyota Motor Manufacturing of Alabama until he was promoted to branch manager for the Huntsville, Alabama branch, which encompasses Northern Alabama and Eastern Mississippi. Michael worked in this capacity for Securitas until October 2012, when the foundation was laid for the formation of MDB Consulting Agency.

Michael is one of approximately 80 people out of 40,000 security professionals to hold all three certifications issued by the ASIS International: Certified Protection Professional (CPP), Professional Certified Investigator (PCI), and Physical Security Professional (PSP).

Victor Cooper, MSM, CPP, Emergency Preparedness Program Manager, Aria Health System

Victor Cooper, MSM, CPP, is a former New Jersey State Trooper with over 25 years of experience in the law enforcement/security industry. He has expertly managed and directed all aspects of physical security for the Philadelphia Eagles football team. Victor assisted in coordinating security operations for two NFL championship football games, three Army/Navy football games (one with a presidential visit, George Bush), international soccer, concerts, and NCAA lacrosse tournaments. He also provided security for Super Bowls forty-one, forty-two, and forty-three and is a former committee member for the Pennsylvania Governor's Homeland Security Council on Terrorism. Victor is currently an adjunct professor of Criminal Justice at Penn State University, emergency preparedness program manager for the Aria Health System, and president of Victor L. Cooper Associates, LLC.

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Frank J. Davies, CHS-IV, CIPS, CVI, is the president of Aella Consulting Group, Inc. He is a 30-year veteran in the physical and electronic security industry. Mr. Davies has designed and implemented many sophisticated integrated security systems for the US Federal Government, airports, Fortune 500 companies, and school and university clientele. As an expert in physical security, he has provided expert witness testimony and detailed reports regarding systems design, compliance, and functionality on high profile cases. Through his schooling, training, certifications, and years of practical application he provides security threat and risk assessments to his clients. As a parent of a school-aged child and security professional, the subject of security within schools continues to be an area he addresses and maintains involvement. His involvement has been in many areas including national councils working to develop standards and continuing to provide information and expertise whenever possible. Mr. Davies has written other published works and holds design patents within the physical security field.

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Rick Draper is a security and crime prevention professional with over 30 years of experience in Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Papua New Guinea, and parts of Asia. He is the principal advisor and managing director of Amtac Professional Services Pty. Ltd. He is also an adjunct senior lecturer in security management and crime prevention in the School of Criminology and Criminal Justice at Griffith University in Queensland, Australia.

Rick's project experience spans a wide range of settings in both the public and private sectors, including undertaking numerous projects for schools, colleges, and universities. Over the past 20 years, he has also demonstrated significant expertise in developing Web-based tools to enhance security and gain efficiency, including solutions for incident reporting, access control management, plotting security observations, and loss prevention. He has written numerous papers, articles, and book chapters on a diverse range of security and crime prevention-related topics, as well as developing and facilitating training and professional development programs in areas of security management, crime prevention, fire safety, and security technology. In 1992, Rick was awarded the Security Australia Annual Achievement Award for the "Pursuit of Excellence and Services to the Security Industry."

Donald R. Green, CPP, CEMA, Director of Operations, Educational Safety Services

Donald R. Green, CPP, CEMA is the director of operations for Educational Safety Services, which provides consulting services and emergency response equipment to K-12 and higher education organizations. He is also the supervisor of security and emergency management for Newport News, Virginia Public Schools, an urban public school district serving over 30,000 students. Green has over 25 years of experience in security and law enforcement management and has worked in disasters and exercises including hurricanes, active shooters, and radiological emergencies.

He is board certified in security management as a Certified Protection Professional (CPP) through ASIS International and is a Certified Emergency Management Assistant (CEMA) through the Virginia Emergency Management Association. Green is also a Certified Gang Specialist and a U.S. Air Force Anti-Terrorism Officer, Level II. He uses his experience and expertise to prepare teachers, administrators, students, support staff, security officers and law enforcement officers for both routine and unique emergency situations in their schools.

Jim Harper, CRL, CIL, K-12 and University Specialist, ASSA ABLOY

Jim Harper has over 39 years of lock industry experience. Since 2006, he has served as K-12 and university end user specialist for ASSA ABLOY, covering 1300 school districts in the New England Region. Prior to this role, Jim has worked with such institutions as Best Locking Systems of New England, John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company in Boston, Clark Security Products, and Boston Children's Hospital.

Jim is a past president of the Institutional Locksmith's Association and remains a life member. He is also an instructor for the Associated Locksmiths of America. Jim also performs services as a legal expert witness in negligent security litigation. He is recognized as an expert in masterkey system design and key control procedures.

Robert F. (Bob) Lang, CPP, CEM, Chief Security Officer at Kennesaw State University

Robert F. (Bob) Lang, CPP, CEM, is currently the chief security officer at Kennesaw State University. Prior to this position, Bob spent 19 years at Georgia Tech University and the Georgia Tech Research Institute as the director of homeland security and the director of research security directing classified operations security. He came to Georgia Tech from the Lockheed Corporation in Marietta, GA where he also directed the classified operations security as well as physical plant and guard units. Prior to Lockheed he was with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in Fort Lauderdale, FL.

Bob has bachelor and master's degrees in criminal justice and is a graduate of the Lockheed Emory and Georgia Tech Management Institutes.

Bob is the author of many articles on security technology, emergency preparedness, business continuity, and risk management. He also has experience with the 1992 Olympics in Barcelona, Spain; the Goodwill Games in 1994 in St. Petersburg, Russia; the 1995 World University Games in Buffalo, NY; and the Atlanta Olympic Games in 1996, where he was the head security planner for the Olympic Village on Georgia Tech's campus.

Joseph C. Nelson, CPP, Vice President of Global Security, State Street Corporation

Joseph C. Nelson, CPP, is currently a vice president, global security with State Street Corporation. Joe is a contributing author to several security industry books, standards, and publications including the *Handbook of Loss Prevention and Crime Prevention*. Joe has over 30 years of diverse physical security leadership experience, maintaining the professional designation of Certified Protection Professional (CPP) since 1990.

Joe holds a Bachelor of Science degree from Northeastern University's College of Criminal Justice and a leadership certificate from Georgetown University. He has served as an emeritus faculty member with the Security Executive Council. Joe has also held global director positions within Iron Mountain, IBM, Lotus, Teradyne, and CMGI.

Jack Poole, PE, FSFPE, Principal, Poole Fire Protection, Inc.

Jack Poole graduated from the University of Maryland in 1986 with a Bachelor's of Science degree in Fire Protection Engineering. Mr. Poole is a principal at Poole Fire Protection located in Olathe, Kansas. Mr. Poole is a registered Professional Engineer (PE) in Fire Protection, licensed in 52 states and territories, and his expertise includes designing fire suppression and detection systems. He has designed hundreds of fire alarm and mass notification systems for public and private clients all around the world. Mr. Poole serves on several NFPA Technical Committees, including NFPA 72; is the chairman of NFPA 520 and serves on the Board of Directors for the Society of Fire Protection Engineers (SFPE); and is an SFPE Fellow.

Philip Purpura, CPP, Director of the Security and Justice Institute, Florence Darlington Technical College

Philip P. Purpura has been a criminal justice educator for more than 20 years. He has directed criminal justice, security, and paralegal programs, and has practical experience as a security consultant, expert witness, security manager, corporate investigator, and police officer. Mr. Purpura is the author of several other textbooks and numerous articles published in newsletters, magazines, and journals.

Rick Shaw, Founder, CEO, and CDO of Awareness

Rick Shaw is the founder, CEO, and CDO of Awareness, with 30 plus years of experience in risk mitigation and prevention processes. Rick's experiences in management, consulting and white-hat hacking across all types of organizations in multiple industries has provided Rick many lessons learned to share with business leaders.

Rick's leadership in creating innovative incident management and prevention services has been honored by leading risk management and insurance experts, including the Risk Innovator award from *Risk & Insurance* magazine, the Responsibility Leader award from Liberty Mutual, the Business Innovation award from Business Insurance, and the Readers' Choice Top 100 award from *District Administration* magazine.

Brad Spicer, Chief Executive Officer, SafePlans, LLC

Brad Spicer began his career as an intelligence analyst in the United States Army and is a veteran of Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Following his enlistment, he spent 11 years with the Missouri State Highway Patrol, serving with the Patrol's Special Emergency Response Team (SERT) and in the Governor's Security Division.

During his time on the State's Governor's Security Detail, Mr. Spicer coordinated security operations during presidential visits and became a nationally recognized expert in the fields of dignitary protection and security. He has received advanced threat assessment training from the United States Secret Service and Gavin de Becker & Associates.

In 2001, Mr. Spicer developed the Emergency Response Information Portal (ERIP™), a comprehensive cloud-based emergency preparedness application, and founded SafePlans. He has grown SafePlans into a national firm with clients in over 25 states, including fortune 500 companies and two of the five largest schools systems in the United States. SafePlans is an Advanced Level IBM Business Partner and ERIP is designated by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security as a Qualified Anti-Terrorism Technology.

Paul Timm, PSP, President, RETA Security, Inc.

Paul Timm, PSP, is a board-certified Physical Security Professional (PSP), president of RETA Security, Inc., and a nationally acclaimed expert in school security. In addition to conducting numerous vulnerability assessments and his frequent keynote addresses, Paul is an experienced School Crisis Assistance Team volunteer through the National Organization for Victims Assistance (NOVA). He is certified in Vulnerability Assessment Methodology (VAM) through Sandia National Laboratories and ALPHA™ vulnerability assessment methodology.

He is also a member of ASIS International, where he serves as vice chairman of the School Safety and Security Council, and is a member of the Illinois Association of School Business Officials (IASBO). Paul is currently working on his MDiv at Moody Theological Seminary. He also holds a degree in Speech Communications and a Certificate in Business Administration from the University of Illinois.

Paul van Soomeren, CEO, DSP-groep (<http://www.dsp-groep.eu/>); Director of the Board, the International CPTED Association and the European Designing Out Crime Association

Paul van Soomeren is the CEO and one of the founders of DSP-groep (www.DSP-groep.eu) a research, consultancy, and management bureau with a staff of 50 based in Amsterdam, the Netherlands. Paul works as management consultant and policy researcher for national and local authorities, the European Union, and international organizations and institutions.

Paul is director of the board of the International CPTED Association (crime prevention through environmental design) and the European Designing Out Crime Association (<http://www.e-doca.eu/>). In that capacity he travels all over the world to lecture on these subjects.

Areas of expertise include urban planning and design, crime prevention, safety and security, schools, education and social management. Paul is a member of the international COST action Management Committee of the European Cooperation in Science and Technology (domain: Transport and Urban Development) which runs until 2017. He is also a visiting professor at the University of Salford (Greater Manchester, UK).

Paul studied Social Geography, and Urban and Regional Planning at the University of Amsterdam. He was a teacher at an Amsterdam high school and worked for the Ministries of Security and Justice and the ministry of Interior (National Crime Prevention Institute) for 3 years before he founded DSP-groep in 1984.

Linda Watson, M.A., CPP, CSC, CHS-V, Principal, Independent Security Consultant at Whirlaway Group LLC

Linda Watson, M.A., CPP, CSC, CHS-V is the principal consultant at Whirlaway Group LLC. She is Board Certified in Security Management by ASIS International, and a Certified Security Consultant by International Association of Professional Security Consultants. Linda has served as a police officer in Massachusetts for more than 20 years. As an independent security consultant specializing in threat assessment, security management, and preparedness planning for private educational institutions and houses of worship. The firm was founded in 2004 by Linda Watson.

BEST PRACTICES—A SIXTEEN-POINT MASTER PLAN

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INTRODUCTION

This chapter was reviewed by members of the ASIS International Crime Prevention and Loss Prevention Council, the School Safety and Security Council, and approximately 50 individuals who attended an educational session on school security at the 2013 ASIS Seminar and Exhibits in Chicago, IL.

Master planning is a catalyst for defining a vision for security that touches all aspects of service delivery, including technology, IT integration, command and control, and communication with stakeholders and employees. The plan should identify areas where security can be repositioned as a core function, contributing to the bottom line of the school. The master planning process enables schools to gain valuable exposure to tools and techniques that increase the value and integrity of their departments. Comprehensive, proactive protection solutions require collaboration among students, teachers, and administrators. You must explore ways to adapt successful emergency response procedures for your particular educational setting.

PART A. ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES

1. Director of Safety and Security

- The school district or campus should have a director of safety and security to oversee the program.
- If utilizing a school resource officer (SRO) on your campus, he/she should be an on-duty, law enforcement officer who is highly visible and required to make random rounds of the property.
- Be aware of the many anonymous tip lines for safety and security concerns on the campus, e.g., Crime Stoppers.
- Implement an anti-bullying policy that is strictly enforced.
- Develop threat assessment teams and have training conducted by a qualified individual.

- When managing your security program and today's software, anticipate the future needs of the school and campus. Install systems and programs with long-term expansion capabilities to accommodate future security needs and upgrades.
2. Vulnerability Assessment (See Chapter 3)
 - Our culture has changed and crimes on school property have changed as well. Needs and deficiencies must be determined in order to have a security program that is effective.
 - Vulnerability assessment is a critical on-site examination used to observe security that is currently in place, identify security deficiencies or excesses, determine what level of security is needed, and finally, to make recommendations for improvement to effectively control the identified risks.
 - After the vulnerability assessment, you and the assessor together will conduct a cost-benefit analysis to determine if the recommendations are affordable, feasible, and practical and if they can be budgeted for as short-term or long-term projects.
 - The assessor will gather statistical data from law enforcement, such as the Uniform Crime Reporting system (UCR), National Incident-Based Reporting System (NIBRS), National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS), and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to examine the frequency of events in your area to determine what can be done to remove or reduce the threat to your campus.
 - A vulnerability assessment should be completed annually (or more often, if there are issues or significant changes to the building or campus) by a qualified individual. At this time, a review of all programs, policies, and training will be done to ensure that you are addressing current security issues.
 3. Security Program Management (See Chapter 17)
 - Establish security policies and procedures that address identified risks and ensure that the security program has the approval and "buy in" of the school district and principal of the school. It is important that policies and procedures are documented and that they address violence prevention and intervention. Security policies and procedures must be supported by school faculty and staff and be consistently enforced.
 - The school district, as well as each individual campus, needs to effectively manage its security program using multilevels of communication, policies and procedures, physical security, and training, as well as response plans. There should be an effective implementation process for short-term and long-term projects.
 - Involve the parents (PTA and other volunteers) as well as students in the School Safety and Security Program. All parties will assist and help educate students about the policies and procedures.
 - Identify and manage your assets by ensuring all prevention, detection, and notification systems (alarms, lighting, video surveillance, intercoms, etc.) are working properly and that high-theft and high-risk areas have the proper coverage.
 - Integrate solutions with existing security systems and infrastructure for maximum return on your investment.
 - Lock classrooms during classes using properly installed hardware.
 4. Background Checks
 - Conduct diligent criminal background investigations (preemployment, annual, as needed) and drug testing (preemployment, for cause, random, post accident or incident) for all faculty, staff, volunteers, contractors, and vendors who are on school property.
 - Implement fingerprinting for all school faculty, staff, volunteers, contractors, and vendors who are on school property.

PART B. PHYSICAL SECURITY (SEE PART II)

5. Lobby of the Administration Building

- Install an intercom with a door-release button, inside the lobby vestibule.
- Have video surveillance of the area.
- Issue and require all students (in grades 9-12), faculty, and staff to visibly display color-coded, identification badges (or smart cards).
- Implement a visitor management system, including sign-in, photo verification, visitor badge (that must be displayed), and escort, if required. Use a driver's license scanner for positive visitor identification. Consider a color-coded badge system for access to specific floors or areas.
- Utilize a computer database sign-in system either in the lobby or online when appointments are requested.
- Exterior doors should be locked at the start of school day (others are egress only and monitored) and only one entrance should be utilized, which should be equipped with intercom and a video surveillance system.
- Determine if walk-through metal detectors and/or handheld units are needed.
- Utilize a panic button or duress alarm in the lobby, which transmits a signal to a central station, who in turn will call the police.
- Have a written procedure for the use of panic buttons or duress alarms. Determine if this should include an automatic lockdown of the school.

6. Signage

- Install signage on campus to direct visitors, contractors, and vendors to the office area to be processed for access.
- Doors (interior and exterior) and windows need to be identified by placement of a number or letter (which is approved by police or fire responders) to identify various rooms in the building and on the campus. Obtain information from other schools and your local fire department to meet standards. Some schools currently have 10"- to 12"-high room numbers. Use the same size for numbers on the front door. (Consider using retro-reflective, 3 M Scotchlite™-type material.)
- In a conspicuous location, post emergency escape route-of-travel maps on walls in all buildings and in all rooms.

7. Perimeter of the Campus (See Chapter 4)

- Clearly identify the perimeter of the campus and utilize the Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) concept of territorial reinforcement so that the school property is easily identifiable from public property. Install fencing and lighting, as necessary.
- In remote or high-risk areas of the campus, consider the ASIS International standard for fencing: 7' in height (with three strands of barbed wire placed 6" apart), if necessary.
- Follow the CPTED concept of maintaining bushes no higher than 3' and tree branches trimmed to 8' from the ground.

8. Perimeter of the Building (See Chapter 4)

- Improve, upgrade, and maintain the door hardware on all outside entry doors and install anti-prop alarms.
- Have full perimeter lockdown capability, either manually or automatic, but ensure that it meets local codes.

- Consider the use of bollards to prevent vehicular access to buildings.
 - Enforce the policy of no-parking areas and designated drop-off areas. No-standing and no-loitering areas must be addressed and enforced.
 - Before planting shrubs or bushes around buildings, consider the growth rate and the maintenance that will be required. Bushes should be no taller than 3' and set back 1 yard from buildings or walkways, per CPTED concepts.
- 9. Access Control Systems (See Chapter 23)**
- A closed-campus proactive capability, with electronic access control, audit database, and anti-pass-back feature should be utilized.
 - Keep access points to a minimum. The general idea is to have one (or few) entrance(s) and many exits.
 - Monitor the school parking lot with video surveillance and issue color-coded parking permits with designated parking areas for students, faculty, staff, and visitors.
 - Before an incident occurs, ensure first responders will have access to buildings (issue all-access cards or master keys at training exercises).
- 10. Key Control (See Chapter 19)**
- If you don't have 100% control over your master and grand master keys, then you must rekey.
 - Establish a key/card management program and assign someone to manage it.
 - Rekey mechanical locks if keys are lost, stolen, not returned at a termination, or otherwise unaccounted for.
 - Consider the use of keyless access control systems so that access can immediately be terminated if a card or code is lost, stolen, or if someone is terminated.
- 11. Lighting (See Chapter 20)**
- Install adequate lighting on campus—especially by walkways, around doorways, and in parking areas. A properly illuminated area acts as a psychological and physical deterrent and can reduce criminal opportunity.
 - Refer to Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), Illuminating Engineering Society of North America (IESNA), and American National Standards Institute (ANSI) for lux and foot-candle lighting-level recommendations. Test illumination annually with a light meter and be cognizant that foliage on trees may obstruct lighting.
 - Be aware of light trespass on neighboring properties.
 - Consider installing cost-effective LED lighting.
 - Have a lighting maintenance plan in place to quickly identify burned-out bulbs or inoperable lights. Assign and display numbers on light poles and fixtures so that those requiring attention can be easily identified. Inoperable fixtures or burned-out bulbs must be repaired or replaced within 24 hours.
 - Lighting needs to be uniform and cost effective with correct foot-candles at various locations.
- 12. Video Surveillance (See Chapter 22)**
- Retain 30 days of video surveillance footage, unless otherwise required.
 - Consider utilizing digital recorders and cloud-based storage.
 - Ensure video surveillance coverage is adequate and utilize video analytics.
 - Install Internet protocol (IP) video cameras and determine if you need a fixed camera or a pan, tilt, zoom (PTZ) unit (PTZ cameras work well but are expensive—almost three times the cost of a fixed camera—and need on-site monitoring to be effective). Budget for this type

of investment. Determine the purpose of your video surveillance program: monitoring and response, forensic purposes only, or both.

- Exterior lighting should be adequate for video surveillance resolution and color rendition index (CRI).
- Integrate video surveillance with access control, especially visitor management.
- Install video surveillance around the perimeter of the building, with attention to doors and accessible windows.
- There are standard locations established for certain types of cameras and monitoring, for example, at the main entrance, exterior entry points, cafeteria, hallways, high-risk areas, high-theft areas, computer labs, and so forth. Cameras are never installed at any location where there is a reasonable expectation of privacy, such as in a restroom or a locker room. Cameras are also typically not installed in instructional areas such as classrooms. There may be other areas identified by school staff, faculty, or assessment that are identified as “hot spots” where video surveillance would be beneficial.
- Integrate video surveillance with alarm (intrusion detection) systems. For example, if a door is propped open, the camera zooms in to determine the cause and then sends notification that a response is required.
- Establish a partnership with local law enforcement to give them remote access to video surveillance for a critical incident or a crime in progress. If the school has an intrusion detection system and it is activated at night, law enforcement or security can respond remotely and disrupt a crime in progress. In this instance, video surveillance may also be used as evidence for prosecution.

13. Fire Alarm Systems (See Chapter 24)

- Conduct regular fire drills and ensure faculty and staff can quickly determine if all students are accounted for. Your visitor management system will help you determine if all visitors have been evacuated in the event of a fire or other emergency.
- Comply with all applicable state codes

14. Emergency Planning (See Chapter 15)

- Develop an emergency response plan and provide training for the staff.
- Establish emergency procedures with standardized actions and directives for inclement weather (tornado, earthquake, hurricane, flooding, etc.), medical issues, fire, building evacuations, shelter-in-place, lockdown, workplace violence, and active shooter as well as a business continuity plan for after the incident (OSHA, National Fire Protection Association [NFPA], FEMA, etc.)
- Ensure your emergency procedures comply with Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) standards (physically handicapped, sight-impaired, hearing-impaired, or special needs students, faculty, staff, visitors, etc.). Have designated individuals trained to assist.
- Conduct training for emergency procedures with the local fire and police departments, EMS, and other local officials. Provide floor plans for each building on the campus to each of these departments. Consider supplying building plans and layout of the campus in a digital format for quicker access by more responders.
- Establish a crisis management team, with documentation. Determine who will make the decision to lockdown the school, how notifications will be made, and who will make notifications to faculty, staff, and parents.

- The crisis management team will handle procedures during and after a crisis situation.
 - Develop mass notification procedures (see below).
 - Provide two-way radios (or another alternative method for communication) for faculty and staff, and establish a designated command center area or location.
 - Ensure you are in compliance with all applicable OSHA regulations, life safety codes, and local and state fire codes.
 - The NFPA 1600 document is needed for all-hazards planning.
Provide FEMA training for administration and crisis team members. An introductory course on incident command systems (ICS) for schools is offered by FEMA: <http://training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/IS/courseOverview.aspx?code=is-100.sca>.
 - Conduct fire, evacuation, lockdown, shelter-in-place, and other emergency drills.
 - Consider using the Standard Response Protocol of the I Love U Guys Foundation (www.iloveguys.org).
 - Develop crisis kits with all necessary supplies for an emergency situation.
 - Collaborate with local law enforcement and other emergency responders to determine if interior door windows are to be covered and/or if shades are to be left open or pulled down in a lockdown situation.
 - Develop a mutual aid agreement with other schools and businesses.
 - Have well-stocked first aid kits on site (e.g., tourniquets, quick-clot gauze, chest seals, pressure bandages).
- 15. Mass Notification Procedures (See Chapter 10)**
- Develop a mass notification program, which includes e-mails, text messages, social media, and public address system announcements, as well as audible and visual alarms.
 - Ensure your mass notification program complies with ADA standards (physically handicapped, visually impaired, hearing-impaired, or special needs students, faculty, staff and visitors, etc.). Have designated individuals trained to assist.
 - Ensure that your procedures meet NFPA Standards & Guidelines, which include a communication program, an incident management system, and individuals trained in ICS.
- 16. Training for Faculty and Staff (See Chapter 27)**
- When hired, conduct classroom training on school policies and procedures and repeat annually at in-service training, or as necessary.
 - Develop a policy for faculty and staff about when to use a fire extinguisher. Discuss when to fight a fire and when to flee a fire. Train faculty and staff on how to use a fire extinguisher.
 - Conduct first aid, CPR/AED, and blood-borne pathogens trainings (29 CFR 1910. 151) and repeat recertification as required.
 - Conduct training on how to respond to medical issues, fire, inclement weather, building evacuations, shelter-in-place, lockdown, workplace violence, active shooter, etc. Teachers and staff will train students.
 - Ask local, state, and federal agencies to participate in your classroom, tabletop, or incident training.
 - Educate students, faculty, and staff about bullying behavior.
 - Inform students, faculty, and staff that they should report and/or challenge anyone on the property who is not displaying an identification badge.

- Educate students, faculty, and staff about “If You See Something, Say Something,” and empower them to report suspicious behavior or behaviors of concern.
- Train faculty and staff in all school security policies and procedures and repeat training as needed or when a change is made. Faculty and staff must consistently follow and fairly enforce all security procedures. There must be clear disciplinary action for anyone not following established rules or procedures.

THREATS AND HAZARDS AT EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS*

2

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EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS

Two major types of educational systems are emphasized here: school districts and higher education. A key difference between school districts and college and university campuses is that, in the former, students normally go home at night and buildings often are empty. On campuses, students often live on the premises in dormitories. Exceptions are community and technical colleges whose students typically commute. School districts and campuses both schedule evening and weekend activities such as classes, sports events, and meetings. A major factor for those who plan and implement protection programs for these institutions is that the security and safety measures must cater to the needs and characteristics of the particular institution.

School districts and higher education are known as the education facilities subsector (EFS) of the government facilities sector under the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP). The U.S. Department of Education's (ED) Office of Safe and Drug-Free Schools (OSDFS) served as the sector-specific agency for the EFS. OSDFS promoted policy and recommendations on safety, health, security, emergency management, and resilience for the EFS. In 2011, the OSDFS became the Office of Safe and Healthy Students.¹ Under the Tenth Amendment ("...powers...reserved to the States..."), the general authority to administer the EFS is empowered to the states. The EFS is highly decentralized and protection is primarily a local responsibility.²

THREATS AND HAZARDS AT EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS

Educational institutions are subject to a host of threats and hazards similar to other segments of society. Examples are crimes of violence, bomb threats, illegal drugs, property crimes, cybercrimes, and vandalism. Additional concerns are fire, accident, disaster, gangs, terrorism, infectious disease outbreaks, food recalls, suicide, date rape, bullying, hazing, crowd control for sports and other events, traffic, parking, student activism, graffiti, the discharge of toxic substances (e.g., the release of pepper spray

*This chapter is excerpted from Purpura P. Protecting Commercial and Institutional Critical Infrastructure. *Security and Loss Prevention*. Boston, MA: Butterworth-Heinemann; 2013. Updated by the author, 2014.

¹U.S. Department of Education (2011). "Office of Safe and Drug-Free Schools." www.ed.gov, retrieved April 15, 2012.

²U.S. Departments of Homeland Security and Education (2010). *Education Facilities Sector-Specific Plan: An Annex to the Government Facilities Sector-Specific Plan*. www.dhs.gov, retrieved April 14, 2012, p. 55.

in a crowded hall), and the release of an animal in a school as a prank. Incidents may involve cross-sector protective efforts that assist in mitigation. For example, health-care and public health sector, transportation sector (e.g., school buses), commercial facilities sector (e.g., stadiums and arenas), and IT communications sector.

PROTECTION FOR EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS

The following list describes measures for security and safety of school districts and institutions of higher education:

- Establish a security and safety committee and meet at least monthly.
- Ensure that all stakeholders and first responders are involved in security and safety planning and programs.
- Conduct risk analyses and prepare comprehensive, all-hazards protection.
- Offer counseling services and programs to assist students in crisis.
- Conduct substance abuse education and prevention programs.
- Typical security measures are access controls, emergency telephones, mass notification systems, intrusion and fire alarms, patrols, CPTED, lighting, and digital surveillance systems (closed-circuit TV, CCTV).
- Use vandal-resistant construction materials.
- If graffiti is an issue, photograph it before removing it and show the photos to police.
- Carefully consider the use of unarmed students to supplement police and security forces; provide good training.
- Research online resources on protection, training programs, and grants (see the Web site addresses at the end of this book).

SCHOOL DISTRICTS

More than 55 million students are enrolled in U.S. elementary through high schools.³ From July 1, 2009 to June 30, 2010, there were 33 “school-associated violent deaths,” defined as a homicide, suicide, or legal intervention (by police), in which death occurred at an elementary or secondary school in the USA. In 2010, for students aged between 12 and 18, 828,400 nonfatal victimizations occurred at school; this includes 358,600 victims of violence and 469,800 victims of theft. During this same year, for students aged between 12 and 18, 652,500 nonfatal victimizations occurred away from school; this includes 281,200 victims of violence and 371,300 victims of theft. It is difficult to draw conclusions about crime victimization and safety “at school” versus “away from school” because of reporting practices of victims and officials. Besides the physical and psychological effect of victimizations at schools, it can lead to increased dropout rates, decline in learning, early retirements, and increased fear.⁴

³U.S. Census (2011). “Back to School: 2011-2012.” www.census.gov, retrieved April 14, 2012.

⁴National Center for Education Statistics (2012). *Indicators of School Crime and Safety: 2011*. <http://nces.ed.gov>, retrieved April 15, 2012.

LEGISLATION FOR SCHOOL DISTRICTS

The *Safe and Drug-Free Schools and Communities Act* supports programs that prevent violence in and around schools, mitigates the illegal drug problem, facilitates parent and community involvement in school challenges, and appropriates funds to local schools and higher education facilities victimized by violence or a traumatic incident. As a requirement for grant funding, the Act necessitates a crisis management plan. In 2011, Congress eliminated programs implemented under this Act. At the same time, the Office of Safe and Healthy Students continues to promote drug and violence prevention programs.⁵

In an attempt to reduce school violence, Congress enacted the *Gun-Free Schools Act*, which requires that each state receiving federal funds under the Elementary and Secondary Education Act must have a state law requiring local educational agencies to expel from school for a period of not less than 1 year a student who is determined to have brought a weapon to school. Each state's law also must allow the chief administering officer of the local educational agency to modify the expulsion requirement on a case-by-case basis.⁶ This law resulted in many schools adopting a *zero-tolerance policy* for weapons being brought to school. In other words, any infraction results in full punishment. This same policy extends to alcohol and drugs. Meadows⁷ writes that the intent of such a policy is both preventive and punitive. He notes the following: "Although zero-tolerance policies have a place in school security, there is the threat of over enforcement, which may undermine school-community relations and label students unfairly."

The *Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act* (FERPA) protects the privacy of students by limiting the types of information school officials can release. School records and personal information are protected. FERPA does not protect information disclosed during an emergency or obtained through observation or personal knowledge (e.g., a teacher hearing a threat from a student).

PROTECTION FOR SCHOOL DISTRICTS

A comprehensive school district loss prevention program must involve the community: students, teachers and administrators, parents, public safety agencies, civic groups, and businesses. The program can be divided into four components: special programs, personnel, physical security, and emergency management.⁸

Special programs include character education to help students distinguish right from wrong, conflict resolution, diversity, prevention of bullying, anonymous tip lines, and programs that involve parents. Since gangs are a problem in many schools and communities, and they are often linked to violence and drugs, school administrators should be proactive to reduce this problem by, for example, meeting police gang specialists on a regular basis to exchange information and antigang strategies. One popular

⁵U.S. Department of Education (2011). "Office of Safe and Drug-Free Schools." www.ed.gov, retrieved April 15, 2012. U.S. Departments of Homeland Security and Education (2010). *Education Facilities Sector-Specific Plan: An Annex to the Government Facilities Sector-Specific Plan*. www.dhs.gov, retrieved April 14, 2012, p. 55.

⁶Anderson, J. (2012). "Gun-Free Schools Act". *Education Law* (February 14). <http://lawhighereducation.com>, retrieved April 15, 2012.

⁷Meadows, R. (2007). *Understanding Violence and Victimization*, 4th ed. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Prentice Hall, p. 170.

⁸Decker, S. (2000). "Increasing School Safety through Juvenile Accountability Programs." Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice.

program is the *Gang Resistance Education and Training (GREAT)* program that provides students with tools to resist the lure and trap of gangs. Modeled after the Drug Abuse Resistance Education (DARE) program, the GREAT program seeks to prevent violence and introduces students to conflict resolution skills, cultural sensitivity, and negative aspects of gang life. This program has spread to all 50 states and several other countries.⁹

All employees at schools should be trained on early warning signs of inappropriate behavior or violence. These signs include feelings of isolation, rejection, and being persecuted, plus behaviors indicating anger or violence, such as threats. Intervention and counseling are vital in response to such signs.

A combined counseling and education approach might reduce student hostility and funnel student time into constructive activities. Traditional suspension from school often sends troublesome students to the streets, where more trouble is likely. On the other hand, if students remain at school in an appropriate program, improved results are probable.

Personnel consist of teachers, teacher aids, administrators, counselors, security officers, and school resource officers (SRO). SROs are police officers on duty at schools; they provide visibility, create rapport with students, and respond to incidents. Parents and volunteers play an important role in supplementing employees. All those who perform job duties at schools should undergo background screening, receive constant training, and clearly understand the policies and procedures for day-to-day events, such as student discipline problems and how to care for people during emergencies.

Physical security examples are handheld and walk-through metal detectors and duress alarms. Students must be safe without feeling as if they are in a prison. Students can swipe an ID card when they climb onto a bus and when they arrive and leave school; RFID tracks their movements. At the same time, CCTV cameras watch students on buses and on school premises. Visitors can be asked for their driver's license to check against a database of sex offenders. The strategies that are implemented should be subject to research and evaluation to produce the best possible solutions and utilization of resources.

Emergency management consists of plans to respond to violence, weapons, hostage situations, bombs/explosions, abused students, aggressive parents who are on the premises, and incidents involving parental rights. Many school districts distribute their crisis plans to public safety agencies that have a ready reference containing maps and building plans, utility shutoffs, staff and parent contact information, a yearbook to identify people, and a set of keys.

The National Center for Education Statistics¹⁰ surveyed public schools and reports a host of safety and security measures at schools, including the following:

- Controlled access and locked doors. Nearly all public schools require visitors to sign in and obtain a visitors badge
- Restrictions on student access to certain Web sites on school computers
- Prohibiting certain electronic devices (e.g., cell phones)
- Anonymous threat reporting
- Drug testing of athletes and other students in extracurricular activities. Random dog sniffs to check for drugs
- Other measures include picture ID, searches, student uniforms, and mass notification systems

⁹Institute for Intergovernmental Research (2012). "Welcome to the G.R.E.A.T. Web Site." www.great-online.org, retrieved April 16, 2012.

¹⁰National Center for Education Statistics (2012). *Indicators of School Crime and Safety: 2011*. <http://nces.ed.gov>, retrieved April 15, 2012.

Research by Sobel¹¹ found that surveillance and searches at a high school were viewed in a positive light by male and female employees. Although students viewed surveillance positively, a majority of students viewed searches of lockers, backpacks, and self negatively.

The *Guide for Preventing and Responding to School Violence*, 2nd edition,¹² offers numerous suggestions, including the topics above and the following: establish a climate for reporting threats and violence, create an antibullying program, use a student court for noncriminal offenses, and educate students about drugs, alcohol, suicide prevention, gangs, and other important topics.

ARE EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS “SOFT” TARGETS?

Terrorists search for “soft” targets containing limited security to increase the likelihood of a successful attack. Examples of “soft” targets are educational institutions, houses of worship, shopping malls, and theaters. “Hard” targets include military bases and fortified government buildings.

Emergency management became an important priority at many schools following the 1999 *Columbine High School massacre*. During this incident in Jefferson County, Colorado, two teenage students, armed with a variety of weapons and bombs, killed 12 students and a teacher, wounded 24, and then committed suicide. Prior to the attack, one of the killers showed warning signs of violence through a Web site, which contained violent threats, information on how to make bombs, and a log of mischief. The massacre fueled debate over gun violence, gun control, and the influence of the media on violence. In addition, the event reinforced attention to warning signs to prevent violence.

Another, more deadly massacre, tied to terrorism, was the *Beslan Elementary School massacre* in 2004. This attack was part of the Chechen war for independence against Russia. Russia has fought an insurgency in the breakaway republic of Chechnya since the 1990s, a time when the former Soviet Union collapsed. The 3-day hostage standoff at the elementary school in Beslan, where Chechen rebels rigged bombs around 1200 hostages, ended in gunfire, explosions, and 338 deaths, mostly children. Each side blamed the other for the battle at the school that caused more controversy over Chechen terrorism and Russian responses.

The carnage began when 32 attackers—armed with AK-47s, a machine gun, grenade launchers, explosives, and two dogs (to protect against chemical attack)—drove to the crowded school and herded children, teachers, and parents into the school gym, which was quickly wired with explosives. Male hostages were forced to build barricades at doors and windows, and when the work was complete, they were executed and their bodies were thrown out of the building. Two female suicide bombers were among the attackers, which illustrated the resolve of the attackers and the possible outcome. The attackers demanded the release of Chechen rebels, the withdrawal of Russian troops from Chechnya, and Chechen independence. The Russian government’s options were very limited, and giving in to terrorist demands fueled new hostage events. By the second day, the terrorists continued to refuse water, food, and medicine for the hostages. In their desperation, the hostages began to drink their own urine. On the third day, the terrorists permitted a crew to collect the bodies of 20 male hostages that had been thrown out of the building. At this point, a bomb exploded within the gym, supposedly by accident, a fire began, the roof collapsed, and as hostages escaped, the terrorists shot them. The terrorists were killed, and two that escaped were caught by a mob and lynched. As the disaster unfolded, “finger-pointing” began to explain what went wrong. Explanations were that Special Forces were not ordered to rescue the hostages and assault the building, no one wanted to take responsibility to order the rescue and assault, and armed volunteers interfered with the hostage situation and were not kept back. The disaster shocked the world, and the Russian government promised reform of the police and military.¹³

¹¹Sobel, R. (2012). “Perception of Violence on a High School Campus.” *Journal of Applied Security Research*, 7 (January-March), pp. 11–21.

¹²International Association of Chiefs of Police and Bureau of Justice Assistance (n.d.). *Guide for Preventing and Responding to School Violence*, 2nd ed. www.theiacp.org, retrieved April 16, 2012.

¹³Abdullaev, N. (2004). “Beslan, Russia.. Terror! In The Schoolhouse!” *Homeland Defense Journal*, 2 (September), pp. 28–35.

ARE EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS “SOFT” TARGETS?—Cont'd

On April 16, 2007, the *Virginia Tech massacre* became the worst school mass murder incident in U.S. history when a mentally disturbed student murdered 32 people and then committed suicide. Among the questions that followed the shootings were: Why did it take over 2 hours to release a notification that a killer was on the loose after two students were found shot earlier in another building? Was the police response quick enough to end the threat of an “active shooter”? Many factors must be considered when attempting to answer these questions. For instance, rushing into a building without a team and a plan is risky. Harwood¹⁴ writes of strategies that require refinement: behavioral threat assessment teams to identify risky students, mass notification systems, and “active shooter” response. The federal government, including the U.S. Secret Service and the FBI, studied campus violence and concluded that although most (73%) violent acts on campus targeted a specific individual because of a triggering event (e.g., romantic breakup or academic failure), “understanding what leads an offender to exclusively target random individuals remains a complex and difficult challenge.” The study also noted the importance of college and university threat assessment teams to evaluate “persons of concern.”¹⁵

COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES

LEGISLATION FOR COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES

In response to increasing crime on college campuses and the need for more accurate statistics, Congress passed the *Student-Right-to-Know and Campus Security Act of 1990*. This Act is also known as the “Clery Act,” named after Jeanne Clery, a college student who was raped and murdered in her dorm room. For institutions receiving federal student aid, this legislation requires crime awareness and prevention policies and an annual report of campus crime sent to the FBI Uniform Crime Reports program, while making these statistics available to students and the general public. Such data, available on the Web, enable comparisons among colleges and universities. Amendments to this Act include the requirement that a campus community must be notified immediately of an emergency or threat to safety, disclosure of emergency plans, reporting on hate crimes, and reporting of relationship of campus police with state and local police. For campuses with housing, the amendments require procedures for missing students and methods of fire protection reporting.¹⁶

Congress enacted the *Campus Sexual Assault Victims’ Bill of Rights* in 1992, requiring schools receiving federal student aid to afford sexual assault victims basic rights and to develop policies to deal with sexual assault on campus.

There is conjecture that some schools omit reporting acts of violence to protect recruiting efforts and their reputations.¹⁷ FBI crime data have been criticized over the years because they represent crimes *reported* to police, and many crimes are never reported or recorded, as shown by victimization studies.¹⁸

¹⁴Harwood, M. (2007). Preventing the next campus shooting. *Security Management*, 51, 55–65.

¹⁵Drysdale, D., et al. (2010). *Campus Attacks: Targeted Violence Affecting Institutions of Higher Education*. Washington, DC: U.S. Secret Service, FBI, DHS, and U.S. Department of Education.

¹⁶U.S. Department of Education (2011). *The Handbook for Campus Safety and Security Reporting*. www2.ed.gov/admins/lead/safety/handbook-2.pdf, retrieved March 10, 2011.

¹⁷Jaeger, S. (2001). “Crime Concerns on Campus.” *Security Technology & Design*, 12 (March). p. 6.

¹⁸Purpura, P. (1997). *Criminal Justice: An Introduction*. Boston: Butterworth-Heinemann.

PROTECTION FOR COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES

Campus Security Guidelines were prepared by the Major Cities Chiefs Association and Bureau of Justice Assistance.¹⁹ These guidelines focus on policies, coordination among local and campus police, interoperable communications, risk assessment, prevention, preparedness, emergency management, and external relations.

Numerous campuses have implemented the strategy of many public police agencies, namely, *community policing*. It aims to control crime through a partnership of police and citizens, and it strives to become a dominant philosophy throughout a police department. Community policing includes a proactive approach to problem solving, rather than responding repeatedly to the same problem. High priorities for protection on campuses are programs that focus on crime prevention, self-protection, and neighborhood watch.

In 2004, a National Summit on Campus Public Safety was held in Baltimore, Maryland. It was supported by the U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services²⁰; the International Association of Campus Law Enforcement Administrators (IACLEA, see below); the International Association of Chiefs of Police; the U.S. Department of Homeland Security; and the FBI. Some of the main points from this summit are as follows:

- There is a need for a national center for campus safety to support information sharing, standards, model practices, and research.
- Many campuses house sensitive materials and information and serve as contractors for the Department of Defense, Department of Justice, National Security Agency, other government bodies, and corporations.
- Securing chemical, biological, and radiological materials in an accessible environment, 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, creates security challenges.
- Many campuses have a substantial number of international students who entered the country through student visas. In addition, many U.S. educational institutions maintain campuses overseas.
- Special events (e.g., sports, graduation, lectures) draw thousands of people to campuses and create vulnerabilities.
- U.S. educational institutions should be more closely linked to local and regional emergency management plans.

Research by Fisher and Sloan²¹ produced the following points that should be considered when evaluating programs designed to reduce campus crime.

- A comprehensive approach includes security, faculty members, staff members, students, and public law enforcement personnel.
- Campus administrators should conduct surveys of the campus community to understand the nature and extent of crime and fear, perceptions of the effectiveness of security, and participation

¹⁹ Major Cities Chiefs Association and Bureau of Justice Assistance (2009). *Campus Security Guidelines: Recommended Operational Policies for Local and Campus Law Enforcement Agencies*. www.majorcitieschiefs.com/pdf/MCC_CampusSecurity.pdf, retrieved April 19, 2012.

²⁰ U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (2005). "National Summit on Campus Public Safety." Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice.

²¹ Fisher, B., and Sloan, J. (1993). "University Response to the Campus Security Act of 1990: Evaluating Programs Designed to Reduce Campus Crime." *Journal of Security Administration*, 16, 67–77.

in crime prevention programs and whether participants adopted any of the preventive measures. Until evaluations become an integral part of responding to campus crime, administrators will continue to make poor decisions on security strategies.

- Research has confirmed that crime on campuses is influenced by poor lighting, excessive foliage, blocked views, and difficulty of escape by victims. (These issues relate to CPTED.)
- Location measures (e.g., proximity to urban areas with high unemployment) are predictors of high campus crime rates.

One particular group that has advanced the professionalism of campus safety and security is the IACLEA. This group began in 1958 with 11 schools, and today, it represents 1200 colleges and universities in 20 countries. The group maintains a Web site of resources; holds an annual conference; offers training, professional development, and standards and accreditation; and publishes the *Campus Law Enforcement*.²²

SAFETY AND FIRE PROTECTION AT EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS

The NFPA 101 Life Safety Code offers guidance to protect educational facilities from fire. Examples of fire hazards endangering life in places of public assembly are (1) overcrowding; (2) blocking, impairing, or locking exits; (3) storing combustibles in dangerous locations; and (4) using combustible decorations. Furthermore, hazards of educational buildings vary with construction characteristics and with the age group of students. Younger students, for example, require protection different from that for older students. The NFPA Life Safety Code specifies that kindergarten and first grade rooms should be on the floor of exit discharge so that stairs do not endanger these students. Because junior and senior high schools contain laboratories, shops, and home economics rooms, these facilities should have fire-resistant construction. School kitchens require similar protection. A fire alarm system is required for all educational buildings. Most schools conduct fire drills for pupils. The Life Safety Code and many good building codes provide numerous standards for increasing fire safety.

For colleges and universities, the Life Safety Code is applied depending on building characteristics and use. If buildings are windowless, the Life Safety Code requirements for special structures are applicable. This includes, for instance, venting systems for smoke. Because many campus buildings are multistory, specific safeguards are necessary. Fire drills and training are important for residence halls and academic buildings. If a campus contains “high-risk” chemicals, it may be subject to regulations of the Chemical Facilities Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS).²³

²² International Association of Campus Law Enforcement Administrators (2011). “About IACLEA.” www.iaclea.org/, retrieved April 17, 2012.

²³ U.S. Departments of Homeland Security and Education (2010). *Education Facilities Sector-Specific Plan: An Annex to the Government Facilities Sector-Specific Plan*. www.dhs.gov, retrieved April 14, 2012, p. 24.

SECURITY ASSESSMENTS AND PREVENTION FOR K-12 SCHOOLS

3

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INTRODUCTION

Our nation's children are welcomed into their schools every day by their teachers and staff. Our educators are focused on educating their students in a safe and secure environment which allows their students to excel. However, safety has become a very complex issue in our schools. Deadly shootings at Columbine, Virginia Tech, and Sandy Hook, to name only a few, have significantly impacted our schools. School shootings are still a rare event, but an event that must be prepared for nevertheless. The sheer number of people who are affected by school safety is compelling:

“As of fall 2010 approximately 75.9 million people were projected as enrolled in public and private schools at all levels including elementary, secondary, and postsecondary degree-granting. In addition, the number of professional, administrative, and support staff employed in educational institutions was projected at 5.4 million.” (U.S. Department of Education 2010)¹

CRIME PREVENTION THROUGH ENVIRONMENTAL DESIGN SCHOOL CPTED SURVEY/ASSESSMENT²

Crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED) is a concept that was first introduced in the 1970s. Timothy Crowe and Lawrence Fennelly provide the following definition of CPTED in their 2013 book, *Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design*:

A CPTED assessment attempts to evaluate the physical setting of facility and maintenance factors that affect the safety and crime quotient capability of a particular school. Environmental factors such as the types of neighborhoods, housing facilities, businesses, streets, and institutions surrounding the school affect the school's operation.

¹Buildings and Infrastructure Protection Series Primer to Design Safe Schools Projects in case of Terrorist Attacks and School Shootings. FEMA –428/BIPS-07/ January 2012 Edition 2.

²Crime prevention through environmental design / Timothy D. Crowe; revised by Lawrence Fennelly—Third edition Appendix B.

Classrooms, security systems, lighting and color designs, accessibility, and quality of maintenance all evaluated to determine their effect on the school climate, natural supervision, defensible space, and differentiated space. The survey items are to be rated as satisfactory (S), unsatisfactory (U), or not applicable (NA).³

SCHOOL CPTED SURVEY OR ASSESSMENT⁴

A thorough CPTED survey should cover the following thirty points:

1. Poor visibility at entry to site
2. Easy vehicular access onto grounds
3. Off-site activity generator
4. Inadequate distance between school and neighbors
5. Easy-access hiding places
6. Area hidden by planting
7. School adjacent to traffic hazard
8. Portion of building inaccessible to emergency vehicles
9. Secluded hangout area
10. Vegetation hides part of the building
11. Site not visible from street
12. No barrier between parking and lawn
13. Gravel in parking area
14. Dangerous vehicular circulation
15. Enclosed courtyard conceals vandals
16. High parapet hides vandals
17. Trees located where visibility is required
18. Pedestrian-vehicle conflict
19. Structure provides hideout
20. Building walls subject to bouncing balls
21. Parts of bus shelter not visible
22. Mechanical equipment accessible
23. Stacked materials and downspouts provide roof access
24. Recessed entry obscures intruders
25. Portions of building not visible from vehicle areas
26. Walkway roof eases access to building roof
27. Recess hides vandals
28. Skylight proves easy access
29. Mechanical screen conceals vandals
30. Access through complex

³Crime prevention through environmental design / Timothy D. Crowe; revised by Lawrence Fennelly—Third edition.

⁴Crime prevention through environmental design / Timothy D. Crowe; revised by Lawrence Fennelly—Third edition
Appendix B.

SECURITY CPTED ASSESSMENT

Conducting a security CPTED assessment or survey of a school starts with the physical security exterior areas described in the above security survey. Additionally, it is important to interview the stakeholders who work in the school. These stakeholders are the eyes and ears of the school and they can identify the problems which exist within their school.

Using an all-hazards approach will cover many of the natural events that are possible: fire, hurricane, tornado, earthquake, flood, or severe wind. Add in manmade events such as chemical, hazardous, and biological catastrophes, and you can see many of the threats to be considered. These events are more likely to occur than a school shooting or a terrorist attack. With the all-hazards approach, you prepare for all possible events versus “just” a school shooting or terrorist attack. An all-hazards approach is the approach that best serves every school, large or small, public or private.

A security assessment is a process of identifying the security risks that a school may be exposed to and how you will respond to them. When identifying risks you must decide if it is too costly to protect or replace an item(s). If that is the case, then you may choose to protect the existing item, but know if a loss occurs it will not be replaced. This is the basis of a security assessment: mitigation, preparedness, and response. Every school is unique and there is no one security assessment that fits every school. By speaking with the stakeholders you get to learn about the community and how the school fits into that community. As you identify the threats, you can then evaluate and rate the level of the threats to the school as a whole. Use a scale starting with very low (1) through very high (10). By rating the threats you are assessing the likelihood or credibility of a threat. These threats are evaluated on the type of loss or damage that would result from an event. This subject has been successfully covered in great detail in the book *Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design, 3e* by Timothy D. Crowe, revised by Lawrence Fennelly. We have attached two appendices to complement this chapter. [Appendix A](#) discusses ten key questions that should guide the assessment of a threat. The use of the Security Assessment/Survey in [Appendix B](#) will help you evaluate the interior and exterior of the school's facility.

Much has been written on the methodologies of how to conduct and evaluate security assessments for school systems. There are many useful tools located on the U.S. Department of Education and American Clearinghouse on Educational Facilities websites.

It is important to emphasize how essential the physical security assessment is as the basis of all other security work. An assessment encourages you to evaluate the potential for internal threats within a school, and when evaluating these internal threats it is wise to look at the vulnerabilities within the school and evaluate “how” the school would be attacked. When you look at the security assessments from this perspective, your individual stakeholders can contribute regarding where they think an attack might be launched from. The internal threats may be a jilted lover or a recently fired employee who feels “wronged.” These potential threats are very dangerous because of the “actor’s” (the person who acts) intimate knowledge of the campus and the unique culture within the educational institution. These actors know all the rules of getting into and out of the campus buildings and where there are vulnerabilities they can exploit because they are a known face at a dorm or classroom complex.

When you look back at past violent school events we can see many patterns emerging within the events themselves. Lessons learned from past school shootings at Columbine, Virginia Tech, and Sandy Hook teach us how to improve our communications with students, visitors, staff, and faculty during an emerging critical event on campus. Unfortunately, the active shooters can also study the past attacks and may have learned from the mistakes of the past as well.

Many times after a tragic event on a school campus, people who have taught the student or were acquainted with the faculty member responsible for the attack say they noticed odd things prior to the event but did not think to report it to authorities. Having an independent reporting system in place that is widely advertised gives concerned persons the ability to report their observations without the fear of reprisals.

In his book, *The Gift of Fear*, Gavin de Becker discusses in great detail the cues that are usually present before an incident (pre-incident cues) but are often ignored by coworkers or faculty and staff. Many times after an event when the media is interviewing persons who knew the actor, a pattern of odd or unusual behavior emerges. However, many of these persons only know the actor in the context of school or work. They do not have the opportunity to compare notes with other parties who also know the actor in a different venue.

TRAGEDIES

After the Columbine, Virginia Tech, and Sandy Hook tragedies we have learned that having a critical incident team (CIT) in place and ready to evaluate a potential at-risk student, faculty member or employee is very important. These teams focus on a holistic approach to evaluating the at-risk individual. The CIT can be composed of many different professionals: commonly there will be administrative, human resources, mental health, legal and law enforcement members. This diversity gives the team the opportunity to evaluate an at-risk person from their “specialty” and report back to their CIT peers with their findings.

In the past, communication was an issue if a student went before the student review board for a violation of some student infraction. Many times, the student review board did not pass their findings onto law enforcement or the mental health counselors. The advantage of a CIT is that they now have the ability to follow up on the student and make cross-department notes with other CIT peers. They are immediately getting involved and holistically evaluating the potential risks that are exhibited by an at-risk student.

In some past tragedies, family members have told the interviewing authorities that they were unaware of any issues involving their loved ones at school prior to the tragic event. With a CIT in place, they can get the family involved in evaluating and discussing their plans for how the student should proceed since the last known issue that has been brought to their attention.

Family members often say in hindsight that given the opportunity to get involved with their loved one they would have done whatever would have been helpful to defuse the situation and avoid the tragic event that occurred.

A review of many of the recent tragic events that have occurred at educational institutions reveals that many times there appears to have been a mental health issue that is only brought to the community’s attention after the incident. Children that have been bullied or attacked on social media after school have nowhere to hide now. Prior to smartphones and current technology, when a child got off the bus at the end of the day, they had a break from school until the next day. Now a child can connect 24/7 with their peers, which can cause them to feel that there is no escape from the harassment or bullying. Despite established rules designed to protect at-risk students from cyber bullying, many times the student does not disengage from social media when school ends.

The impact of being bullied or picked on can become enormous, forcing a student to withdraw from the school environment. Some students become isolated and may not have adequate parental supervision or a trusted adult who can help them engage in a healthy dialog with their peers. Some students react to bullying by acting out with violence.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, security assessments for K-12 schools should also include a CIT component to evaluate the threats and risks to a school from internal threats. The emphasis in the past was on the facility and threats to that facility. This emphasis remains very important, but we now must look at internal threats such as the risk from students, visitors, vendors, and faculty or staff members. By having an open dialog across departments, the likelihood of thwarting an internal threat is much greater. People are your greatest asset and your greatest vulnerability.

APPENDIX A: U.S. SECRET SERVICE THREAT ASSESSMENT SUGGESTIONS

This appendix is reprinted from “Guide for Preventing and Responding to School Violence,” Bureau of Justice Assistance, 2007, page 18, Grant 2007-DD-BX-K112.

School and law enforcement officials are frequently placed in the difficult position of having to assess specific people (students, staff, teachers, and others) who may be likely to engage in targeted violence in which there is a known or knowable target or potential assailant. The following suggestions for threat assessment investigations are based on guidelines developed by the U.S. Secret Service’s National Threat Assessment Center (NTAC). They were developed primarily for preventing the assassination of public officials, so they may not be applicable to all school situations. To identify threats, school officials are advised to take the following steps:

1. Focus on individuals’ thinking and behavior as indicators of their progress on a pathway to violent actions. Avoid profiling or basing assumptions on sociopsychological characteristics. In reality, accurate profiles for those likely to commit acts of targeted violence do not exist. School shootings are infrequent and most people who happen to match a particular profile do not commit violent acts. In addition, many individuals who commit violent acts do not match profiles.
2. Focus on individuals who pose a threat, not only on those who explicitly communicate a threat. Many individuals who make direct threats do not pose an actual risk, while many people who ultimately commit acts of targeted violence never communicate threats to their targets. Before making an attack, potential aggressors may provide evidence they have engaged in thinking, planning, and logistical preparations. They may communicate their intentions to family, friends, or colleagues, or write about their plans in a diary or journal. They may have engaged in attack-related behaviors: deciding on a victim or set of victims, determining a time and approach to attack, and selecting a means of attack. They may have collected information about their intended targets and the setting of the attack as well as information about similar attacks that have previously occurred.

Once individuals who may pose a threat have been identified, 10 key questions should guide the assessment of the threat:

1. What motivated the individual to make the statement or take the action that caused him or her to come to attention?
2. What has the individual communicated to anyone concerning his or her intentions?
3. Has the individual shown an interest in targeted violence, perpetrators of targeted violence, weapons, extremist groups, or murder?

4. Has the individual engaged in attack-related behavior, including any menacing, harassing, or stalking-type behavior?
5. Does the individual have a history of mental illness involving command hallucinations, delusional ideas, feelings of persecution, and so on, with indications that the individual has acted on those beliefs?
6. How organized is the individual? Is he or she capable of developing and carrying out a plan?
7. Has the individual experienced a recent loss or loss of status, and has this led to feelings of desperation and despair?
8. Corroboration: What is the individual saying, and is it consistent with his or her actions?
9. Is there concern among those who know the individual that he or she might take action based on inappropriate ideas?
10. What factors in the individual's life and environment might increase or decrease the likelihood of the individual attempting to attack a target?

Source: R. Fein and B. Vossekuil, National Threat Assessment Center, U.S. Secret Service.

APPENDIX B: SCHOOL SAFETY AND SECURITY CHECKLIST

SCHOOL SAFETY AND SECURITY CHECKLIST		
School District:	School:	Address:
Team Members:		
Date:	School Representative:	
Instructions: This checklist is designed to help evaluate the safety and security of your school. The best way to use it is to form teams to conduct the survey at locations other than their own to keep observations neutral and objective. Each survey team should ensure that local law and fire personnel are invited to help with the evaluations and planning. Audit team members should review the following documents and materials, preferably in advance of the onsite visit: 1. Student / staff code of conduct 2. Data on student discipline referrals 3. Criminal data (reported by the school and by the surrounding community) 4. Blueprint of the school 5. Crisis management plan 6. Information and data protection (records, examinations, etc.) The checklist does not take the place of crisis management plans or emergency plans but supports the testing and adequacy of these plans. School safety and security requires policies and procedures for management of disciplinary issues and dangerous students. You can contact _____, if you have questions or need assistance at _____.		

SAFETY AND SECURITY TEAM NOTES		
SCHOOL EXTERIOR AND PLAY AREAS	YES	NO
1. School grounds are fenced. 2. What kind? 3. If yes, approximate height (security fencing should meet zoning and code standards. Best height prevents unauthorized entry and is 6-8 ft tall with a turned top to restrict scaling) Are gates secured by locks? 4. There is one clearly marked and designated entrance for visitors. 5. Signs are posted for visitors to report to main office through a designated entrance. 6. Restricted areas are clearly marked. 7. Shrubs and foliage are trimmed to allow for good line of sight (3'-0"/8'-0" rule). 8. Shrubs near building have been trimmed "up" to allow view of bottom of building. 9. Bus loading and drop-off zones are clearly defined. 10. Access to bus loading area is restricted to other vehicles during loading/unloading. 11. Staff is assigned to bus loading/drop off areas. 12. There is a schedule for maintenance of: a. Outside lights b. Locks/hardware c. Storage sheds d. Windows e. Other exterior buildings 13. There is adequate lighting around the building. 14. Lighting is provided at entrances and points of possible intrusion. 15. Play areas are fenced. Visual surveillance of playground areas is possible from a single point. 16. Playground equipment has tamper-proof fasteners. 17. Visual surveillance of parking lots from main office is possible. 18. Parking lot is lighted properly and all lights are functioning. 19. All areas of school buildings and grounds are accessible to patrolling security vehicles. 20. Students/staff are issued parking stickers for assigned parking areas. 21. Student access to parking area is restricted to arrival and dismissal times. 22. Staff and visitor parking has been designated.		

23. Outside hardware has been removed from all doors except at points of entry. 24. Ground floor windows: a. Broken panes b. Locking hardware in working order 25. Basement windows are protected with grill or well cover. 26. Doors are locked when classrooms are vacant. 27. High-risk areas are protected by high security locks and an alarm system a. Main office b. Cafeteria c. Computer labs, information and data protection (records, examinations, etc.) d. Industrial arts rooms e. Science labs f. Nurse's office g. Boiler room h. Electrical rooms i. Phone line access closet 28. Unused areas of the school can be closed off during after school activities. 29. There is two-way communication between the main office and: a. Classroom (each classroom has a phone or direct intercom connection) b. Duty stations c. Re-locatable classrooms d. Staff and faculty outside building (all locations have communications) e. Buses 30. Students are restricted from loitering in corridors, hallways, and restrooms. 31. Restricted areas are properly identified. 32. There are written policies restricting student access to school grounds and buildings.		
SCHOOL INTERIOR AREAS	YES	NO
33. There is a central alarm system in the school. If yes, briefly describe: 34. The main entrance is visible from the main office. 35. There is only one clearly marked and designated entrance for visitors. 36. Multiple entries to the building are controlled and supervised. 37. Administrative staff maintain a highly visible profile. 38. Signage directing visitors to the main office is clearly posted.		

39. Visitors are required to sign in. 40. Visitors are issued ID cards or badges. 41. Proper identification is required of vendors, repairmen. 42. The following areas are properly lighted: a. Hallways b. Bathrooms c. Stairwells 43. Hallways and bathrooms are supervised by staff. 44. Doors accessing internal courtyards are securely locked from the inside. 45. Exit signs are clearly visible and pointing in the correct direction. 46. Switches and controls are properly located and protected. 47. Access to electrical panels is restricted. 48. Faculty members are required to lock classrooms upon leaving. 49. One person is designated to perform the following security checks at the end of day: a. All classrooms and offices are empty and locked b. All restrooms are empty c. All locker rooms are empty d. All exterior entrances are locked e. All night lights are working f. Check the alarm system 50. The telephone numbers of the principal or other designated contact person are provided to the police department so the police can make contact in the event of a suspicious or emergency situation. 51. There is regular maintenance and/or testing of the entire security alarm system at least every six months. 52. Are classrooms numbered with reflective material: a. Over door b. On bottom of door c. On an exterior window (visible to emergency personnel) 53. Has consideration been given to replacing present classroom locks with locks that can be activated from the inside? 54. Does the PA system work properly: a. Can it be accessed from several areas in the school b. Can it be heard and understood outside 55. Has consideration been given to establishing a greeters' window inside the first set of exterior doors (must be manned at all time)? 56. Are convex mirrors used to see around corners in hallways? 57. Are convex mirrors used to see up and down stairwells? 58. Do all exterior doors have signs requiring visitors to report to the main office to sign in and obtain ID? 59. Has consideration been given to installing proximity readers on certain exterior doors?		
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60. How do you communicate during emergencies: a. Two-way radios b. Cell phones c. Pagers d. Other 61. Who is issued two-way radios: a. Administrators b. Custodians c. Members of the emergency response team d. Other 62. There is a control system in place to monitor keys and duplicates. 63. Mechanical rooms and hazardous storage areas are locked. 64. Fire drills are conducted as required by law.		
DEVELOPMENT / ENFORCEMENT OF POLICIES	YES	NO
65. A visitor policy is in effect, requiring a sign-in procedure for all visitors, including visible identification. All staff members are trained to challenge any visitor without identification. 66. The school has a crisis management plan in effect that is reviewed and updated annually. 67. The incident command system is an integral part of the safety plan. 68. A chain of command has been established for the school when the principal and/or other administrators are away from the building. 69. The school has implemented pro-active security measures on campus, at school-sponsored activities, and on all school property (i.e., school buses). 70. The policy provides a system(s) whereby staff and students may report problems or incidents anonymously. 71. Specific policies and/or procedures are in place that detail staff members' responsibilities for monitoring and supervising students outside the classroom, such as in hallways, cafeteria, rest rooms, etc. 72. The school has implemented and communicated a pro-active policy regarding parental actions during sporting events.		
PROCEDURES FOR DATA COLLECTION	YES	NO
73. All violations of state and federal law are reported to law enforcement. 74. An incident reporting procedure for disruptive and violent students and incidents has been established in accordance with the local or state requirements.		
INTERVENTION AND PREVENTION PLANS	YES	NO
75. Students have access to conflict resolution programs. 76. Students are assisted in developing anger management skills. 77. Diversity awareness is emphasized. 78. Students may seek help without the loss of confidentiality.		

79. Students and staff are aware of bullying consequences and programs are in place to prevent verbal, physical, and non-physical bullying such as emails, threats, and exclusion.		
STAFF DEVELOPMENT	YES	NO
80. Administrators and staff (including security and law enforcement personnel) are trained in conflict resolution methods. 81. Administrators and staff (including security and law enforcement personnel) are trained in implementation of the crisis management plan and have that training updated annually. 82. Administrators and staff are trained in personal safety. 83. School resource officers (law enforcement) receive in-service training for their responsibilities. 84. School volunteers receive training to perform their duties. 85. Teachers and staff are made aware of their legal responsibilities for the enforcement of safety rules, policies, and state and federal laws. 86. School safety and violence prevention information is regularly provided as part staff development plan. 87. Staff development opportunities extend to support staff, including cafeteria workers, custodial staff, secretarial staff, and bus drivers.		
OPPORTUNITIES FOR STUDENT INVOLVEMENT	YES	NO
88. Students are represented on the school safety team. 89. The school provides opportunities for student leadership related to violence prevention and safety issues. 90. The school provides adequate recognition opportunities for all students. 91. Students are adequately instructed in their responsibility to avoid becoming victims of violence (i.e., by avoiding high-risk situations)		
LEVEL OF PARENT AND COMMUNITY INVOLVEMENT	YES	NO
92. The community supports the school's programs and activities that teach safety and non-violence. 93. School activities, services, and curricula reflect the characteristics of the students and the community. 94. School safety planning reflects the neighborhood, including crime and hazardous conditions. 95. Parents are an integral part of the school's safety planning and policymaking. 96. Parents are aware of behavioral expectations and are informed of changes in a timely manner. 97. Local businesses and other community groups are involved in the school's safety planning.		
ROLE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT	YES	NO
98. Incidents of crime that occur on school property or at school-related events are reported to law enforcement.		

99. Law enforcement is consulted on matters that may fall below the threshold of criminal activity. 100. Law enforcement personnel are an integral part of the school's safety planning process. Law enforcement and fire departments have complete current campus maps, floor plans and diagrams showing the location and use of all rooms and critical materials such as chemicals and utility shut-off. Police and fire departments have had tours of the buildings and opportunities to familiarize themselves with the campus. 101. The school and local law enforcement have developed a written agreement of understanding, defining the roles and responsibilities of both. 102. Law enforcement personnel provide a visible presence on campus during school hours and at school-related events. 103. Local law enforcement provides after-hours patrols of the school site.		
DEVELOPMENT OF A CRISIS MANAGEMENT PLAN	YES	NO
104. The school has a crisis management plan: a. Reviewed on an annual basis b. Developed by the building safety team and reviewed by management. c. Team membership is open to all employees and student representatives 105. The school has established a well-coordinated emergency plan with law enforcement and other crisis response agencies. 106. Categories listed in the plan should include, but may not be limited to, the following: a. Natural disasters b. Accidents c. Acts of violence d. Death e. Loss of power f. Fire g. Earthquake		
SAFETY AND SECURITY TEAM NOTES		

CPTED APPLICATIONS FOR SCHOOLS*

4

Timothy D. Crowe

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The proper design on effective use of the built environment can lead to a reduction in the fear and incidence of crime, and to an improvement in the quality of life.

Dr. C. Ray Jeffery

INTRODUCTION

There are many examples of CPTED applications. Those that follow are intended to stimulate readers to think of adaptations to their own environmental setting. Each situation is unique, requiring its own individual application of CPTED concepts. No two environmental settings are exactly the same, even though they serve the same function. Accordingly, the reader must use the strategies that make the most sense within each different location. Paul van Soomeren¹ notes that there are many crime-prevention concepts and theories which would aid the practitioner in reducing the fear of crime:

In Europe...CPTED-like crime-prevention approaches are also known as the situational approach, designing-out crime (DOC), or to stress the more social and organizational aspects of the approach, the reduction of crime by city maintenance, urban planning and architectural design or the Situational Crime Reduction in Partnership Theory, also known as SCRIPT (van Soomeren, 2001).

SITUATIONAL APPROACHES

I (Fennelly) remember, several years ago, when one of my institution's dormitories was experiencing a high frequency of cash and small items being stolen from unlocked rooms. We addressed the problem in two ways:

*Portions of this chapter are excerpted from Crowe T. and Fennelly L. Examples of CPTED Strategies and Applications. Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design. Boston, MA: Butterworth-Heinemann; 2013. Updated by the author, 2014.

¹van Soomeren, Paul. (2013). *Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design*. Boston: Butterworth-Heinemann.

1. First, we took one of our old police cruisers that was no longer in use and parked it right in front of the building. The midnight-to-8 a.m. watch commander was in charge of moving it up and down the roadway so it appeared to be an active vehicle.
2. Second, we did an educational program to get students to lock their dorm rooms.

The thefts stopped and the fear of crime was reduced among the student body. Consider taking positive actions such as the ones from the above example to help alleviate a negative problem.

OBJECTIVES FOR SCHOOL ENVIRONMENTS

1. *Access controls.* Provide secure barriers to prevent unauthorized access to buildings, grounds, or restricted interior areas.
2. *Surveillance through physical design.* Improve opportunities for surveillance by physical design mechanisms that increase the risk of detection for offenders, enable evasive actions by potential victims, and facilitate intervention by police.
3. *Mechanical surveillance devices.* Provide businesses with security devices to detect and signal illegal entry attempts.
4. *Design and construction.* Design, build, or repair buildings and building sites to enhance security and improve quality.
5. *Land use.* Establish policies to prevent ill-advised land and building uses that have a negative impact.
6. *Owner and management action.* Encourage owners and managers to implement safeguards to make businesses and commercial properties less vulnerable to crime.
7. *User protection.* Implement safeguards to make shoppers less vulnerable to crime.
8. *Social interaction.* Encourage interaction among business people, users, and residents of commercial neighborhoods to foster social cohesion and control.
9. *Private security services.* Determine necessary and appropriate services to enhance commercial security.
10. *Police services.* Improve services to efficiently and effectively respond to crime problems and enhance citizen cooperation in reporting crime.
11. *Police and community relations.* Improve police and community relations to involve citizens in cooperative efforts with police to prevent and report crime.
12. *Community awareness.* Create community crime-prevention awareness to aid in combating crime in commercial areas.
13. *Territorial awareness.* Differentiate private areas from public spaces to discourage trespass by potential offenders.
14. *Neighborhood image.* Develop a positive image of the commercial area to encourage user and investor confidence and increase the economic vitality of the area.

CRIME ENVIRONMENTS

Most places have no crime and most crime is highly concentrated and in a relatively small number of places. If we can prevent crime at these high crime places, then we might be able to reduce total crime.²

²Ronald V. Clarke. Hot Products: Understanding, Anticipating and Reducing Demand for Stolen Goods. Police Research Services Paper 112. The Home Office U.K. 1999.

What follows are descriptions of several high-crime environments, their problems, and the appropriate CPTED strategies and design directives.

CRIME ENVIRONMENT: PARKING LOTS

Crimes that commonly occur in parking lots include:

- Assault;
- Theft;
- Breaking and entering; and
- Vandalism.

Crime environment problem

- Location and design of student parking near bus-loading areas without restricting borders promotes unmanaged pedestrian use of parking areas, promotes preemption of space by groups, and prohibits natural surveillance. Assaults, breaking and entering, thefts and vandalism occur (one half of vandalism are incidents with breaking and entering procedures).
- Design and location of parking lots provide unclear definition of transitional zones and unmanaged access by vehicles and pedestrians and students and nonstudents. Breaking and entering, thefts, vandalism and trespassing occur.
- Location of informal gathering areas designated as smoking zones in open corridors adjacent to parking lots and visible from public thoroughfares prohibits natural surveillance, attracts outsiders, and is an impediment to school policies restricting student use of parking lots during school hours. Breaking and entering, thefts, and vandalism occur.
- Isolation of student parking lots (some locations) prohibits any natural surveillance. Variable student hours limit use of fencing and gates. Breaking and entering, thefts, and vandalism occur.

CPTED strategies

- Relocate and/or redesign bus-loading and parking lot access procedures to reduce the necessity of pedestrian use of the lot, reduce congestion in transition zones, and support strict definition of parking lot use.
- Provide natural border definition and limit access to vehicular traffic in student parking and clearly define transitional zones to reroute ingress and egress during specific periods and to provide natural surveillance.
- Relocate informal gathering areas to places with natural surveillance that are isolated from the view of public thoroughfares and designed to support informal gathering activities.
- Relocate student parking (or part of) to areas with natural surveillance and/or locate safe activities in juxtaposition with student parking to increase natural surveillance.
- Redesign parking lots to provide levels of security consistent with variable access needs of the students.
- Remove graffiti within 24 hours and repair vandalism also within 24 hours.

CPTED design directives

- Switch locations between student parking and driver education range.
- Designate access ways to the student parking lot that avoid the bus-loading zone.
- Install hedges around parking lots less than 3' high.
- Install aesthetically pleasing gates on vehicular access points.

- Set policies to limit student pedestrian use of the parking lots.
- Organize a student/faculty committee to assist in the design and coordination of the border definition and parking lot access control activities.
- Organize a student/faculty committee to assist in the design and coordination of the mini-plaza activities.
- Switch locations between student parking and the driver education range.

CRIME ENVIRONMENT: SCHOOL GROUNDS

Crimes that commonly occur on school grounds include:

- Assault;
- Breaking and entering of motor vehicles as well as the building;
- Bicycle theft;
- Vandalism;
- Buying of drugs; and
- Bullying/harassment/fighting.

Crime environment problem

- Design of and procedures for bus-loading areas prohibit teacher surveillance, increase supervision ratio, impede pedestrian traffic flow, and cause congestion. Confrontations, thefts, and vandalism occur.
- Location of informal gathering areas (natural and designated) promotes the preemption of space, interferes with traffic flow, and prohibits natural surveillance. Assaults occur.
- Design, use, and location of bicycle compounds or parking areas on school grounds prohibit natural surveillance and limit proper use because of students with variable hours. Thefts of bicycles occur.
- Design, use, and location of facilities have created opportunity for breaking and entering, theft, and vandalism to occur. (One half of vandalisms are incidents with breaking and entering.)

CPTED strategies

- Redesign bus-loading zone and service procedures to increase surveillance area for natural surveillance, control pedestrian flow, and decrease the ratio of students to supervisors.
- Remove vandalism within 24 hours.
- Relocate informal gathering areas near supervision or natural surveillance.
- Redesign informal gathering areas to promote orderly flow and breakup the preemption of space by groups.
- Provide functional activities in unused or misused problem areas to promote natural surveillance, increase safe traffic flow, and attract different types of users.
- Provide clear border definition of transitional zones for access control and surveillance.
- Notify the police if drugs are sold on school grounds.
- Provide functional community activities on school campus (off hours) to increase surveillance through effective use of facilities.
- Overcome distance and isolation by improving communications to create rapid response to problems (and its perception) and more effective surveillance.
- Redesign bicycle parking areas to provide levels of security consistent with variable access needs of students.

CPTED design directives

- Create one zone in the surveillance area for loading and unloading students, limited in size to a maximum of 4-5 buses.
- Require bus drivers to allow students to enter or leave their bus only when in a specified loading zone.
- Create a bus queuing zone for waiting buses that is convenient to the loading zone.
- Require teachers on monitoring assignment at the bus-loading zone to direct the movement of buses and to disperse each group of students from the bus-loading area before allowing another group to load and unload.
- Move benches and physical amenities that support informal gatherings from undefined areas to courtyards.
- Relocate the student smoking zone to the interior courtyards.
- Remove conventional picnic tables and benches.
- Install new tables and benches that physically divide the space and size of groups.
- Position amenities to create multiple access and passageways.
- Place ticket booths in problem areas.
- Create mini-plazas in courtyards.
- Organize a student/faculty committee to assist in the design and coordination of mini-plaza activities.
- Install low hedging no higher than 3' with flowerbeds or ornamental fencing along borders.
- Organize a student/faculty committee to assist in the design and coordination of border definition activities.
- Create a police "school precinct" office.
- Install audio horns for burglar alarm system. Provide portable radios to deans, school resource persons, custodians, and security or law enforcement.
- Create a fenced bicycle cage parking area (secure area).
- Create an open bicycle parking area located in a place with good natural surveillance (nonsecure area).
- Assign students to either a secure or nonsecure bicycle parking area based on their schedules.
- Install ground-level locking devices in each bicycle parking area.
- Set a policy requiring students to utilize a bicycle locking cable or chain.

CRIME ENVIRONMENT: CORRIDORS

Crimes that commonly occur in corridors include:

- Assault;
- Threats; and
- Extortion.

Crime environment problem

- Design and use of corridors provide blind spots and isolated areas that prohibit natural surveillance. Assaults, threats, and extortions occur.
- Class scheduling promotes congestion in certain areas at shift changing that decreases supervision capabilities and produces inconvenience. Assaults and confrontations occur.

- Location of benches and/or other amenities in corridors creates misused space and congestion. Corridor locations are lacking in natural surveillance because of design. Assaults and confrontations occur.
- Location and use of corridors for functions other than pedestrian passage such as smoking zones promote preemption of space by groups and unsurveillable misused space. This misused space supports behavior that attracts outsiders to the external corridors designated as smoking areas. Assaults, confrontations, and other illegal activities occur.
- Design and definition of corridor areas do not support a clear definition of the dominant function of that space (i.e., passage). Unclear transitional zones produce behaviors conducive to assault and confrontation.

CPTED strategies

- Provide functional activities (or re-designate use) in blind spots or isolated areas to increase natural surveillance (or the perception thereof).
- Remove obstacles to natural surveillance (increase perception of openness).
- Revise class scheduling and management procedures to avoid congestion, to decrease supervision ratio, and to define time transitions.
- Relocate informal gathering areas to areas with natural surveillance that are designed to support the particular activity.
- Relocate activities and functions from misused space to areas designed in support of these activities and to provide natural surveillance.
- Provide clear definition of the dominant function (and the intended use of space) and clearly define transitional zones to increase territorial concerns and natural surveillance.

CPTED design directives

- Relocate teacher planning areas.
- Redesign blind spot areas to provide storage spaces for clubs and/or the school administration.
- Install windows in walls along problem corridors.
- Install windows in walls of exterior stairwells.
- Provide a 3-5 minute shift change hiatus between lunch periods.
- Remove benches and other physical amenities from crowded corridors that are over 3' tall.
- Provide healthy cafeteria food at the gymnasium snack bar.
- Provide multiple access to the snack bar and install queuing lanes.
- Place graphic designs in stairwells and corridors defining the intended function of these spaces.
- Color code various sections of the school and use graphics and art designs uniquely for each functional component of the school.

CRIME ENVIRONMENT: CLASSROOMS

Crimes that commonly occur in classrooms include:

- Assault; and
- Theft.

Crime environment problem

- Design requirements for classrooms produce isolation of individual classes, resulting in high student-to-teacher ratios and little external natural surveillance (real or perceived) when class is in session. Assaults occur. Theft occurs when class is empty.
- Location and design definition of multiple-purpose classrooms produce unclear transitional zones, decreases territorial concern, and decreases natural surveillance. Thefts occur.

CPTED strategies

- Remove obstacles to natural surveillance to increase risk of detection and to reduce perception of isolation.
- Overcome distance and isolation by improving communications to create rapid responses to problems, the perception of rapid response, and more effective surveillance.
- Extend the identity of surrounding spaces to multiple purpose space to increase territorial concern and natural surveillance.
- Provide functional activity in problem areas to increase territorial concern and natural surveillance.

CPTED design directives

- Install windows in classroom walls and doors.
- Provide portable radios to deans, school resource persons, and custodial personnel.
- Install alarm systems in problem classrooms for after hours.
- Color code and graphically identify multiple-purpose classrooms with adjacent spaces.
- Relocate a teacher planning area to each multi-purpose classroom.

CRIME ENVIRONMENT: RESTROOMS

Crimes that commonly occur in restrooms include:

- Assault; and
- Extortion.

Crime environment problem

- Location of restrooms near external entrances and exits isolates them from normal school-hour traffic flow and prohibits surveillance. Assaults occur.
- Privacy and isolation required for internal design provides blind spots that reduce surveillability on the part of students and supervisory personnel (i.e., exterior door and anteroom wall). Assaults occur.

CPTED strategies

- Limit access to isolated areas during specific times for access control and to reduce the need for surveillance.
- Remove obstacles to natural surveillance to decrease fear, increase use, and increase risk of detection.

CPTED design directives

- Organize student/faculty committees by functional component to select and coordinate the graphic design and color coding activities.
- Install collapsible gates at restroom entrances for locking during problem periods.

- Remove entrance doors to restrooms.
- Eliminate unnecessary portions of anteroom walls.

CRIME ENVIRONMENT: LOCKER ROOMS

Crimes that commonly occur in locker rooms include:

- Theft;
- Breaking and entering; and
- Fights/assaults.

Crime environment problem

- Design and use of lockers (by multiple assignment) disperses students throughout the area, reduces surveillance, and increases territory for teacher supervision. Breaking and entering and thefts occur.
- Similar design of lockers creates confusion and decreases natural surveillance by creating unclear definition of transitional zones. Breaking and entering and theft occur.
- Isolation of locker area while class is in gymnasium or on playing field eliminates natural surveillance. Breaking and entering and thefts occur.

CPTED strategies

- Redesignate use of space to increase territorial concern, to increase the defined purpose of space, and to reduce area requiring surveillance.
- Provide clear definition of transitional zones and use of space for easy recognition of bona fide users.
- Provide functional activities in problem areas to increase natural surveillance.

CPTED design directives

- Assign lockers by section, separately for each class.
- Color code locker sections uniquely for each class.
- Relocate a teacher planning area to the physical education offices.
- Assign teachers to the planning area during all classes.

CONCLUSION

This chapter discusses CPTED strategies and design directives for combating crime in schools. Your objective is always to reduce opportunity for a crime to occur or make it harder for a crime to occur. This is done through risk assessment studies, communication, awareness, target hardening, putting controls in place, access control, surveillance, and proper management of the complex.

Below is a list of four proven tactics for the prevention of crime in schools:

1. Support school staff in their efforts to keep guns, knives, and other weapons out of schools.
2. Encourage students to report any weapons they know about on school property to school authorities or to the police.
3. Involve students in issues. Young people can and do organize events against weapons and violence.
4. Show and teach students how to settle arguments without resorting to violence.